

KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
Washington
September, 1959

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September 11, 1959

U. S. Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and
Suggested Tactics for Conversation with Him

I. Occasions for Talks

- A. Initial call, afternoon of Khrushchev's arrival (3:30 - 5:00 p.m.) September 15.
- B. Weekend at Camp David, September 25 (6:00 p.m.) to September 27 (12:00 noon).
- C. At larger gatherings: President's dinner, September 15, and Khrushchev's dinner, September 16.



II. U. S. Objectives

Our key purpose should be to impress on Khrushchev the urgent need of a serious search for ways to reduce the dangers inherent in the present situation and of seeking an acceptable basis for improved relations.

In pursuing this purpose we should try:

- A. To make Khrushchev understand that, if the USSR continues to act on its view that the balance of power is shifting to the Soviet bloc and to attempt to enforce its will on non-Communist countries (Berlin and Laos are current examples), the risks of war will increase as we intend to honor our commitments. Arms limitation and control will then become difficult if not impossible and the U.S. will be forced to intensify its defense preparations.
- B. To convince Khrushchev of our sincere interest in arms control but to make it unmistakably clear that adequate inspection and control is the minimum price at which it can be achieved.
- C. To point out the benefits to both sides of better relations but to emphasize that competition in peaceful fields must be conducted according to accepted ground rules applicable to both sides.

III. Probable

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III. Probable Khrushchev Line

Khrushchev will press for "peaceful co-existence." His recent speeches and his article in "Foreign Affairs" as well as the current Soviet line suggest that he will make or imply the following points:

- A. The world must recognize that Soviet power guarantees the permanence of existing Communist regimes. "Peaceful competition" must proceed elsewhere.
- B. Expanded trade is the best road to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
- C. U. S. bases abroad are the major impediment to agreement on arms control and to better bilateral relations.
- D. "Re-militarization" of Germany is the major threat to peace and to progress on the German question.
- E. A summit conference should be convened to discuss vital issues as decisions can only be reached on that level.

IV. Agenda

- A. Khrushchev's initial call is scheduled for 3:30-5:00 p.m. The President might wish to cut it short and propose a helicopter tour of Washington.

The primary goal of this conversation would be to make Khrushchev receptive to serious talks at Camp David.

- 1. The conversation could open with some informal welcoming remarks and brief general conversation on Khrushchev's tour of the country. We tried to meet his desires and trust he finds the arrangements satisfactory. We would have preferred that it afford greater opportunity to meet broader and more varied sectors of our country and society. We hope he will come to understand the principles and convictions which motivate and guide our people as well as see how widely distributed are the benefits of our productive labors. Our papers, radio and TV are prepared to cover his trip thoroughly, but we hope

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that this will not prevent his observing as much of the life of the country as possible.

2. To emphasize the urgency of serious discussion and implicitly the inadvisability of a propagandistic approach to the visit, the President might make these points - in a grave manner.
 - a. Under present Sino-Soviet Bloc policy of pressure and crisis, the US and USSR seem headed for a sharp clash. The USSR could hardly have staged a more dangerous crisis than Berlin. As the President predicted in his July letter to Khrushchev, failure of the USSR to respond to the President's suggestion for a flexible Soviet position at Geneva has resulted in a distinctly less favorable atmosphere for the visit.
 - b. The President and the American people cannot understand why the Bloc should have chosen this particular time to instigate another dangerous crisis, in Laos. (To emphasize this issue, the President might hit this point hard and often during the talks.)
 - c. The US will not try to avoid a clash by backing away from its commitments. We have made our position on Berlin clear. We will fulfill our obligations to Laos.
 - d. If Khrushchev seeks peace, he should use these visits for serious discussion of ways for ensuring that the competition between our two systems does not explode into nuclear devastation.
 - e. If Khrushchev is disposed for serious talks on his return, he will find the President anxious to reciprocate. Such talks could lay the groundwork for fruitful subsequent negotiations.
 - f. The President might conclude by stressing that he is not willing to submerge U.S.-Soviet differences in meaningless camaraderie. He and the American people are well aware of true Communist purposes regarding the United States

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and other countries. He is in deadly earnest, however, in seeking to find a basis for confining the competition to peaceful fields.

3. Discuss and decide what will be said to the press. We will probably want to keep it brief and general.

(Khrushchev may attempt to introduce substantive issues such as Berlin and Germany or U.S.-Soviet trade relations. He is extremely forceful in conversations and if we wish to avoid detailed discussion of substantive issues, we must be prepared to deflect him. One way would be to parry each sally by treating it as a suggestion of a subject for later conversations.)

- B. Khrushchev will be at Camp David from the evening of September 25 until noon September 27. This should afford ample time for a full discussion of important issues. However, in view of Khrushchev's tendency to long harangues on subjects of interest to him, it would probably be useful for the President to indicate at the outset of each session what topics he intends to cover.

1. The central theme of the Camp David talks might be: The major task of modern statesmanship is to find a way to relieve the threat of destruction which weapons of mass destruction have hung over mankind. Khrushchev can make a great contribution to this task and will be so judged in history, not by how much power he can amass and wield. Continued Soviet pressures will, of course, meet our determined resistance and the risk of war will remain and probably increase.

2. Major topics for substantive discussions:

- a. Over-all U.S.-Soviet Relations.
- b. Berlin and Germany.
- c. Arms control, nuclear testing and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- d. U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations.
- e. Laos.



f. Communist

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f. Communist China.

A suggested approach to each of these subjects is included in this paper.

3. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a joint communique. Khrushchev may propose unacceptable or undesirable wording that implies our acceptance of the permanence of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, that hints at U.S.-Soviet "understanding" on issues affecting our allies, that leaves the impression that important divisive issues have been ignored or glossed over, or that suggests that the bilateral talks were a kind of summit meeting.



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OVER-ALL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy has been characterized by two divergent tendencies. (1) He has expanded the area of normal intercourse between the USSR and non-Communist countries, eliminated some major points of friction in Soviet international relations, engaged more actively in multi-lateral international endeavors and organizations and permitted greater Soviet contact with the outside world. He has also shown some evidence of a wish to negotiate seriously on at least some aspects of arms limitation. (2) He has asserted that Communism will spread throughout the world and his intent to assist the process. He authored the current Soviet line that the balance of power is shifting to the Sino-Soviet bloc and he has tried to capitalize politically on the anticipated shift of power in order to weaken the positions of countries opposing the USSR.

Khrushchev can be expected to deny vehemently the second tendency, stress his allegiance to the first which he calls "peaceful coexistence" and maintain that steps be taken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as a means of further decreasing world tensions. Among his more likely proposals in this regard are a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement; a U.S.-Soviet non-aggression pact, friendship treaty or agreement on the non-use of force; some proposal for expanded exchanges or an agreement to cooperate in peaceful use of atomic energy. He will probably claim that U.S. bases encircling the USSR are a major impediment to improved U.S.-USSR relations and to progress in arms control negotiations.

The President may wish to point out these two tendencies in Soviet policy. To underscore our awareness of the tendency to aggressive expansionism he could refer to Berlin, the vicious Soviet propaganda against the Shah of Iran, the current Communist subversion attempts in Laos, Soviet support for provocative actions of the Chinese Communists against Taiwan, Soviet encouragement of Communist disruptive activities in Latin America, and particularly to Soviet threats of nuclear destruction to its neighbors.

The President might state that Khrushchev has an historic responsibility before him in deciding the future course of Soviet foreign policy. History could record him as a leading statesman if he helped to remove the burden of fear and sacrifice

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imposed by the armaments race. The U.S. and the USSR would then be able to confine their competition to peaceful fields. Of course, the ground rules would have to be agreed,--and the competition, in ideas as well as the economic and cultural fields, would have to take place within the Communist as well as in the non-Communist world. The prospects for expanded economic relations and even for cooperation against the world's want, ignorance, and disease would then be bright.

The aggressive course can only lead to an intensification of the arms race. Khrushchev has (or will) see the industrial strength and productivity of this country. He will also have seen that the U.S. economy is now geared primarily to the satisfaction of popular wants. This is the path we prefer. It is not the only one we can follow. In three years during the last World War when we channeled our industrial energies to produce for national objectives, we doubled our production. If we are forced to, we can redirect a greater section of our economy to such objectives now, to armaments, to foreign assistance, both military and economic, and to other national objectives. The USSR would presumably respond in kind; the people of both our countries would suffer, but the USSR would have left us no other choice and Khrushchev would bear a grave responsibility before the world.

Khrushchev has counselled patience in our relations and expressed frequently his confidence in Communism's superiority. It would seem the height of folly to endanger the achievements in both countries by impetuous acts designed to hasten unduly what he considers inevitable historical processes.



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BERLIN AND GERMANY

Khrushchev will probably stress West German rearmament as the root of the problem, urge acceptance in fact of the "reality" of the existence of the GDR, claim Soviet Geneva proposals are considered and constructive contributions toward a German settlement, deny aggressive intent, and claim Western disinterest in reunification. We have no indications that he will be prepared to alter existing basic Soviet positions, but he might be willing to weaken the link between the Soviet-proposed interim agreement and the all-German committee. He may also seek to find out under what, if any, conditions we would be prepared to withdraw our forces from Germany.

It will be fundamentally important that we communicate our conviction that German reunification is the key condition of a stable European and world peace and a four-power responsibility. The Soviet proposal for "a Peace Treaty with the two German States" is in effect a proposal for the partition of Germany, to which the U.S. could not be a party. We could challenge Khrushchev's belief that Communists can unite Germany by imposing their will on the West Germans and ask him to set time by which he would be willing to subject his belief to the test of popular German verdict.



We shall, of course, stress with all vigor our determination to honor our commitment for the security of Berlin and the danger of war if the Soviets follow their announced course. This might be counter-pointed by expressing our failure to understand why Berlin and its relation to East Germany is not a valid example of competition in peaceful fields. Our proposals on Berlin could be cited as an effort to define the terms of the competition.

After we point out why we find Soviet proposals on Berlin and Germany unacceptable, we ask for any alternate proposals he may have. We could refer to his remark to the Vice President that there was more than one way to settle this problem.

Briefing papers are D-1/5 and D-1/6.

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ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR TESTING AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Arms Control and Nuclear Testing

Khrushchev will profess a desire for arms reduction and a willingness to accept "efficacious" control. However, he will cite American bases and troops abroad as the major impediment to arms reduction and assert that unless the bases are liquidated and the troops withdrawn, the attempt to introduce controls is an ultimatum, designed to procure intelligence.

We stress the urgent need for progress in arms reduction and control and point out that such progress would create a better climate in which to approach other international problems. Khrushchev must be made to understand, however, that effective control and inspection is the minimum price for agreement and that we will judge the sincerity of his desire for agreements by the Soviet attitude toward controls. The nuclear test talks and the forthcoming disarmament talks can be discussed in this context.

American bases and troops abroad were a response to Soviet aggressive acts. They are but one aspect of armaments. We do not regard them as eternally fixed but they and Soviet bases can be discussed in the overall context of arms limitation.

Briefing papers are D-1/7 and D-1/10.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

Active Soviet participation in the IAEA has been slight. However, this past year they did make a contribution in rubles to the Voluntary Budget of the Agency in the equivalent of \$125,000. It would be of interest to the United States to know Soviet intentions toward the IAEA since many of the functions of the Agency, which the United States regards as important and has supported, have been opposed by the Soviet representative. If the opportunity presents itself, the President might desire to indicate the strong United States support for the Agency and endeavor to ascertain Soviet intentions from Mr. Khrushchev.

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